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INTRODUCTION*
In this first issue of Volume 56, The Survey discusses current
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trends in various areas of New York law. The doctrine of collateral
estoppel is treated in two of the decisions analyzed. In Gilberg v.
Barbieri, although recognizing that a harassment violation is simi-
lar in significance to a traffic infraction, the Court of Appeals held
that a conviction in a harassment violation proceeding will not bar
relitigation of the same issue in a subsequent civil action. The Ap-
pellate Division, Second Department, in Kossover v. Trattler, also
denied collateral estoppel effect to a default judgment rendered in
a physician's action to recover payment for services rendered.
Thus, a subsequent medical malpractice action was not precluded.
The majority decision was based on a technicality, however, and
has not changed the general New York rule which gives such de-
fault judgments collateral estoppel effect.
The second Court of Appeals decision analyzed in The Survey
is Marine Midland Bank-Southern v. Thurlow. Faced with the
question whether the parol evidence rule applies only to evidence
of prior agreements between the parties to a written contract, the
Court in Marine Midland held that the parol evidence rule will bar
evidence of prior inconsistent agreements between one of the par-
ties to a written contract and a third party. Also highlighted in this
issue is the Appellate Division, First Department's decision in
Schiavone Construction Co. v. Elgood Mayo Corp. The Schiavone
court held that in a strict products liability cause of action, eco-
nomic losses may be recovered against a manufacturer with whom
the plaintiff was not in privity. Notably, the court deviated from
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Extremely valuable in understanding the CPLR are the five reports of the Advisory
Committee on Practice and Procedure. They are contained in the following legislative docu-
ments and will be cited as follows:
1957 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 6(b) .......................... FIRST REP.
1958 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 13 .......................... SECOND REP.
1959 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 17 ........................... THIRD REP.
1960 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 120 ......................... FOURTH REP.
1961 FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE .............................. FINAL REP.
Also valuable are the two joint reports of the Senate Finance and Assembly Ways and
Means Committee:
1961 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 15 ............................ FIFTH REP.
1962 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 8 ............................. SIXTH REP.
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the traditional view that economic losses are only recoverable in a
breach of warranty cause of action. It is hoped that The Survey's
treatment of these and other developments in New York law will
be of help and of interest to the New York practitioner.
CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES
ARTICLE 14A-CoMPARATIvE NEGLIGENCE
CPLR 1411: Comparative negligence statute applies to loss of
consortium action and operates to reduce consortium award by
degree of spouse's contributory negligence
In New York, a cause of action for loss of consortium is con-
sidered to be defived from, not independent of, the injured
spouse's direct cause of action.1 Consequently, prior to the enact-
' Liff v. Schildkrout, 49 N.Y.2d 622, 632, 404 N.E.2d 1288, 1291, 427 N.Y.S.2d 746, 749
(1980); see, e.g., Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 507-08, 239 N.E.2d
897, 902-03, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305, 312 (1968); Maxson v. Tomek, 244 App. Div. 604, 605, 280
N.Y.S. 319, 320 (4th Dep't 1935); cf. Reilly v. Rawleigh, 245 App. Div. 190, 191, 281 N.Y.S.
366, 367 (4th Dep't 1935) (derivative action for child's medical expenses). The loss of con-
sortium cause of action has been described as encompassing "not only loss of support or
services, [but] also ... such elements as love, companionship, affection, society, sexual rela-
tions, solace and more." Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d at 502, 239
N.E.2d at 899, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 308.
Before the widespread adoption of comparative fault principles, most jurisdictions held
that an injured spouse's contributory negligence would bar any recovery by the consortium
spouse on the ground that the loss of consortium cause of action was derived from the per-
sonal injury claim. See, e.g., Note, Torts-Action for Loss of Consortium-Husband's Con-
tributory Negligence as a Bar, 11 WAYNE L. REV. 824, 827 (1965). Commentators have criti-
cized the derivative status of loss of consortium claims, noting that such status permitted
the courts effectively to impute negligence. See, e.g., Gilmore, Imputed Negligence, 1 Wis.
L. REV. 193, 211-12 (1921); James, Imputed Contributory Negligence, 14 LA. L. REV. 340,
354-56 (1954); Love, Tortious Interference with the Parent-Child Relationship: Loss of an
Injured Person's Society and Companionship, 51 IND. L.J. 590, 630-31 (1976); note 16 infra.
Notably, the loss of consortium cause of action has been envisioned as analogous to claims
for property damage occurring when a contributorily negligent person damages his spouse's
automobile in a collision with a third party. See James, supra, at 354-56. Observing that the
spouse's negligence is not imputed to the owner of the car in an action for property damage,
commentators have argued that the loss of consortium plaintiff should not be subject to the
imputation of fault and should be treated as having an "independent" claim. See Gregory,
The Contributory Negligence of Plaintiff's Wife or Child In An Action for Loss of Services,
Etc., 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 173, 174-91 (1935); James, supra, at 354-56. One author has sug-
gested a compromise position under which consortium claims would be considered only fac-
tually derivative. Love, supra, at 630-31. Under this view, the consortium plaintiff would be
required to establish a prima facie case in favor of his spouse against the defendant. Id. The
action, however, would be considered independent for all other purposes, thus precluding
imputation to the spouse of the primary plaintiff's negligence. Id.
New York has refused to hold that consortium claims can exist independently of the
spouse's personal injury claim. See, e.g., Liff v. Schildkrout, 49 N.Y.2d 622, 632, 404 N.E.2d
